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{1} Thank you. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I appreciate the invitation. What I want to talk about
are some legal issues relating to labeling and, in particular, constitutional issues relating to mandatory
labeling for genetically modiﬁed foods or food products that may contain genetically modiﬁed
components. This is a separate issue from whether or not the FDA, or some other agency, has
sufﬁcient statutory authority at present to mandate labeling, and that is something worth discussing.
Even if they do have such authority, or even if Congress tomorrow were to give the FDA such
authority or were to require the FDA to impose labels on genetically modiﬁed foods, or if a state
sought, to impose mandatory labeling requirements on genetically modiﬁed foods as was proposed in
Oregon, there are many reasons to wonder whether such requirements would be held constitutional
under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence with regard to commercial speech.
{2} For some this may seem a little odd. What do you mean the government couldn’t mandate
labels? Certainly, up until about thirty years ago, the idea that the government couldn’t make
companies provide whatever information the government thought important was relatively
widespread.1 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that commercial speech
is protected speech.2 It may not be as protected as political speech, but it is nonetheless subject to
constitutional protection. Compelled speech is also subject to the same sort of sort of constitutional
scrutiny as restricted speech, particularly when laws or regulations compel either individuals or
corporations to give voice to messages that may be confused with political content with which the
speaker disagrees.3 I think that in the context of genetically modiﬁed foods, we certainly see that
potential.
{3} I want to walk through what some of the red ﬂags about mandatory labeling for genetically
modiﬁed foods and what sorts of constitutional limits such proposals might have. The Supreme
Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence is, shall we say, a little bit ambiguous. A majority of the
current Justices have suggested that the current tests are wrong, but the Justices have yet to settle on
a better test or different test.4 There is a case that will probably be heard this term in the Supreme
Court,5 but certainly there is an element of tea-leave reading in all of this because the Court has not
fully clariﬁed the precise limits on regulation of commercial speech. Nonetheless, there are many
reasons to be skeptical that a government requirement that products that may contain genetically
modiﬁed material have to bear the warning, “Contains GMOs” or “May Contain GMOs” would pass
muster. Such a requirement could well be struck down on constitutional grounds.
{4} The analysis for commercial speech initially concerns whether there is a need to protect the
public from misleading information.6 There are all kinds of requirements that take the form of: If a
company makes a claim, it has to qualify that claim with additional information to ensure the initial
claim does not mislead consumers. So for example, when certain nutritional claims are made, if the
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FDA does not approve of those claims, the companies can be required to say so. If a company says
“Blueberries are good for you,” it may have to qualify the claim in a particular way, or acknowledge that
the FDA does not approve of the claim.7 In such cases, absent the additional information, the initial
claim is considered to be misleading. Note that a company in this context always has the option of not
making the initial claim.
{5} For the law students here, there are cases involving legal advertising. For example, in some
states, if a lawyer advertises that they take all cases on contingency and the lawyer only gets paid if the
client wins, if the client could potentially be liable for court costs, lawyers are required to provide that
information when they advertise that they take cases on a contingency basis.8 Otherwise, consumers
could be liable for economic costs of which at they would not be aware. The initial claim could be
misleading.
{6} In the GMO context, however, this analysis is not applicable because companies are not saying
anything, so that initial justiﬁcation for a requirement – to clarify a true, but otherwise misleading
statement – is not available. Absent that kind of justiﬁcation, the government must have what is
characterized as a substantial governmental interest to infringe upon commercial speech.9
{7} The sorts of substantial interests one can think of are things like unidentiﬁable health risks,
an economic impact, or a physical impact on the consumer. In all cases in which these speech
requirements have been upheld, these are the sorts of risks that the uninformed consumer, that is risks to
which the consumer without the information could be subject. So, companies must disclose ingredients
in products, because consumers may have allergies, or because consumers may be on fat-restricted
diets or sodium-restricted diets. This sort of information can prevent a negative material impact on
the consumer. In the case of generic labeling for genetically modiﬁed foods, however, the question is
whether or not that sort of interest can be asserted.
{8} You heard from several speakers about the conclusions of the National Academy of Sciences and
the FDA that there is no material difference based on the technology used.10 So long as that is the
consensus of regulatory agencies, it will be very difﬁcult for the government to assert the potential
health risk of GMOs as an interest justifying labeling. Generalized consumer desire to have more
information, may, under some interpretations, be enough to trigger FDA’s statutory authority, but it
probably isn’t enough to satisfy the First Amendment requirements.
{9} In the context of genetically modiﬁed foods this, in fact, was tested in federal court. In
International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, the State of Vermont wanted to require milk
producers to label milk that had come from cows that had been treated with a recombinant bovine
growth hormone (rBGH).11 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said Vermont can’t mandate this
because the government did not identify any difference in the milk. It could not identify any health
risk, or anything else that would rise to the level of substantial governmental interest that would justify
mandating labels on milk and requiring milk producers to provide information that they don’t want to
provide.12
{10} The court said that absent this interest, there is no reasonable concern for human health or safety
or some other sufﬁciently substantial governmental concern, thus manufacturers cannot be compelled
to disclose their use of rBGH. Consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest to sustain
the mandatory labeling, even of a factually accurate statement.13 Even though we may be a bit more
permissive about mandating purely factual statements, it’s not enough that some consumers may
care about it. One of the reasons for this is that there is no end to the sort of things government could
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possibly require under such a standard.14
{11} Even if a substantial interest is demonstrated, there still must be a ﬁt between the speech
mandate the label requirement and the asserted governmental interest.15 When it comes to
genetically modiﬁed foods, brieﬂy consider the following example. Let’s say there is a particular
product, a genetically modiﬁed product, that does raise the risk of allergenicity and the government
said, “we’re worried about allergenicity so we want you to label.” The problem is that a “May Contain
GM Products” or “May Contain GMOs” label doesn’t have any connection to the state concern because
there is nothing about GM technology, as such, that increases the risks of an allergic reaction. There are
lots of products for which GM technology may have been used that pose no foreseeable potential risk
for allergenicity. So even where an interest is asserted, there must be some connection, though there is
some ambiguity in the Court’s jurisprudence about how close the ﬁt must be.
{12} We also know that there must be some tailoring, some effort by the governmental agency to
make the disclosure of the labeling requirement match the concern that justiﬁes mandating speech
in the ﬁrst place. This leads us, I think, to question the constitutionality of a requirement to label
foods with “Contains GMOs” or “May Contain GMOs.” While there’s less constitutional question
about identifying speciﬁc products or speciﬁc crosses, or speciﬁc genes where those speciﬁc genes
produce very speciﬁc concerns requiring labeling on that basis. What about a qualiﬁed product labeling
requirement that only applied to those products where there was reason to suspect allergenecity? In this
example, labeling might work for these speciﬁc instances, but across the board, it would not.
{13} The last thing I want to say is that the GM debate – is mostly about values and about ethical
concerns. This fact raises an additional red ﬂag under the First Amendment because the Court has
always been very sensitive to the idea that compelling an individual to give voice to a controversial
message, or to make a statement with which they disagree, is something that the government should
rarely be allowed to do. Anti-GMO proposals are not about health risks, but about how we feel about
GM technology and how our foods should be produced.
{14} A GMO labeling requirement would be likely to face additional scrutiny because there would be
real suspicion that the basis for the labeling is not health concerns, but political control over the sorts
of messages and values that we communicate in the food distribution process and in the food market
process. In that context, courts have made it clear that those are the sorts of debates that the government
should stay out of and should be left to the market place of ideas.
{15} Let me give one example how this might work. New York State had a law about kosher labeling
whereby New York State certiﬁed the labeling of kosher products. The law was struck down on
constitutional establishment of religion grounds because the State was deciding what was kosher and
what wasn’t kosher, and that’s a religious issue.16 Someone might say “That might leave a lot of people
in the dark because for a lot of people knowing how our food is made is incredibly important.” The
reality, however, is that there are all kinds of religious, non-government groups that engage in kosher
label certiﬁcation of and employ various levels of stringency for kosher foods. The consumer who cares
can still get the information absent a government label.17
{16} The constitutional barrier for the government being able to mandate a particular label does not
necessarily mean that there are other non-governmental labeling schemes which can rise up and provide
consumers with the sort of information that they may, for very good reasons, feel that they want or need
when they are deciding what products to buy.
___________________________________________________________________________________
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